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There has been only one time in my life that I did not agree with Ad 
Foolen. This might be due to Ad’s unusual ability to see the merits in 
all other peoples’ opinions, or in a general reluctance we share to adopt 
controversial viewpoints (or it might be that we both are usually right), 
but the fact is that we agree at almost all occasions. Except this one time. 
I had written a column in a students’ newsletter M’ntaal (the title is a 
pun on the word mental and my language, which is in turn a reference to 
a popular magazine Onze Taal ‘our language’) about a well-known Dutch 
advertisement with the slogan: 
 
(1) Mediamarkt! Ik ben toch niet gek? 
Media-market! I am PRT not  crazy? 
‘Media-market! I am not crazy, you know!’ 
 
I wondered  how this slogan generated the meaning  that the speaker 
is a satisfied customer  of the Dutch  electronics  store Mediamarkt by 
questioning his own mental abilities. Somehow the logic seems to be that 
the fact that the speaker is supposed not to be crazy apparently entails that 
Mediamarkt is the store of his choice. Strangely enough, however, when 
the first sentence is spoken with interrogative intonation, the meaning is 
exactly the opposite: 
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(2) Mediamarkt? Ik ben toch niet gek? 
Media-market? I am PRT not  crazy? 
‘Media-market? I am not crazy, you know?’ 
 
Now the logic seems to be that the fact that the speaker is supposed not 
to be crazy leads to the conclusion that Mediamarkt  is not the store of his 
choice. So how can this be? 
In my column, I speculated that the phrase Ik ben toch niet gek has the 
meaning “If I would be crazy, I would not X”, where the meaning of X is 
construed from the previous sentence. An affirmative previous sentence, 
like the exclamation Mediamarkt!, which would be taken as I approve of 
Mediamarkt!, would thus give “If I would be crazy, I would not approve 
of Mediamarkt”. In the case of an interrogative previous sentence, this 
would be taken as an implicit negation (not approving of Mediamarkt). 
This would lead to a meaning “If I would be crazy, I would not not approve 
of Mediamarkt”, which is logically  equivalent to “If I would  be crazy, I 
would approve of Mediamarkt”. 
Ad did not agree with this. According to him, the derived meaning of 
Ik ben toch niet gek? (“I am not crazy, you know”) was entirely determined 
by pragmatic factors. The phrase is nothing more than the affirmation of 
an opinion that is already present in the context. 
In a way, I am inclined to agree with  this. Indeed, the exclamation 
Mediamarkt! already gives rise to a positive opinion about this store, and 
the interrogative intonation Mediamarkt? automatically leads to some 
sort of questioning, which is bound to lead to a negative opinion. So the 
addition of the phrase Ik ben toch niet gek? indeed does not seem to have 
a decisive effect on the positive of negative opinion. However, I think this 
observation is slightly beside the point. 
So what I will try to do in this paper is this: I will try to show that I 
agree with Ad, without changing my original viewpoint. More specifically, 
I will argue that the actual point is not the fact that an exclamation and a 
question lead to different opinions, but rather that the interrogative form 
of the first sentence in combination with the addition Ik ben toch niet gek! 
is incompatible with a positive interpretation. 
First, let me confirm the observation that Ik ben toch niet gek? does not 
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necessarily determine the opinion the speaker has towards the previous 
sentence. If the previous sentence clearly states a positive or negative 
opinion, the addition  strengthens this opinion: 
 
(3) Ik ga met dit weer eens lekker een wandeling maken. Ik ben 
I  go with this weather PRT nicely a walk make. I  am 
toch niet gek? 
PRT not  crazy? 
‘I am going to take a nice walk with this weather. I am not crazy, 
you know?’ 
 
(4) Ik ga met 
 
dit 
 
weer 
 
echt 
 
geen wandeling maken. Ik ben toch 
I  go with this weather really no walk make. I  am PRT 
niet gek? 
not  crazy? 
‘I am really not going to take a walk with  this weather. I am not 
crazy, you know?’ 
 
The addition Ik ben toch niet gek? does not have any effect on the opinion 
expressed in the previous sentence. In (3), the implication is that I am 
going to take a walk, whereas (4) implies that I am not going to take a walk. 
The addition in (3) implies that I would be crazy not to take a walk, and 
(4) means that it would be crazy to do so. 
The particle toch, used in a question, triggers a request for affirmation 
by the listener (or reader) of some logical reasoning (cf. also Foolen, 2006). 
So in (3), by agreeing with the assertion that the speaker is not crazy, the 
listener is forced to adopt the intention of going to take a walk as a logical 
implication: 
 
(5) If I am not going to take a walk, I am crazy. I am not crazy. Therefore, 
I am going to take a walk. 
 
If we take p to be I am going to take a walk, and q is I am crazy, this can 
be seen as the classical syllogism modus tollens: 
 
(6)      [[¬p ! q] ^ ¬q] ! p] 
 
This is the reasoning implied in (3). For (4), it is this: 
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(7)      [[p ! q] ^ ¬q] ! ¬p] 
 
So what we see in (6) and (7) is that the propositions literally expressed in 
the first sentences of (3) and (4) (p or ¬p: I am (not) going to take a walk) 
are presented as the consequens of the syllogism. 
My observation  in the original column in M’ntaal was that the sin- 
gle word Mediamarkt! spoken as an exclamation, generated a positive 
proposition about the store (I feel positive about it, I buy there), whereas 
the same word uttered as a question (Mediamarkt?) generated a negative 
proposition (I do not feel positive about it, I do not buy there). Assuming 
this is correct, there is no need to suggest that Ik ben toch niet gek? is 
ambiguous: it simply generates the syllogism with the proposition as its 
consequens, and its negation in the antecedens. 
So far, Ad and I do not disagree (we’re not crazy, you know).  The 
proposition is entirely dependent on the first sentence, the affirmation 
comes from the addition.  However, we get a strange result when we look 
at questions expressing positive opinions like (8): 
 
(8) Zal ik eens een lekker wandelingetje gaan maken? 
Will I PRT a nice little-walk go make? 
‘Shall I take a nice little walk?’ 
 
Especially when spoken to oneself, this apparent question clearly ex- 
presses a positive intent to take a nice little walk. This is for the large 
part due to positive markers like eens and lekker, and the diminutive 
form wandelingetje, but even without these one can perfectly utter this 
question with a positive attitude. However, strangely enough, it seems 
impossible to add Ik ben toch niet gek? to this: 
 
(9) #Zal ik eens een lekker wandelingetje gaan maken? Ik ben toch 
Will I PRT a nice little-walk go make? I  am PRT 
niet gek? 
not  crazy? 
‘Shall I take a nice little walk? I am not crazy, you know!’ 
 
Apparently,  although the addition Ik ben toch niet gek? clearly does not 
determine the proposition expressed in the previous sentence, I does 
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seem to impose some restrictions. More specifically, if the previous sen- 
tence is a question, the proposition taken to construct the syllogism is the 
negation of the one expressed. In (9), the proposition that is expressed is 
that I am going to take a walk, so Ik ben toch niet gek? takes the negation of 
that, and asks for an affirmation of the consequens that I am not going to 
take a walk. Since this is not the intent of the speaker, a semantic conflict 
results. 
Of course, (9) can be made acceptable by adding non-linguistic infor- 
mation between the first and second sentence. For instance, if the speaker 
makes a disapproving noise, or grimaces, this is enough to generate the 
negative proposition, and license Ik ben toch niet gek! 
This is indeed an unexpected result if only pragmatic  factors are at 
work here. Since the first sentence in (9) clearly expresses a positive opin- 
ion, why can the addition not simply take this positive opinion as the 
consequens of the syllogism? Why is it imperative that the interrogative 
form with the addition Ik ben toch niet gek? is associated by a negative 
opinion? 
The conclusion must be that there is also a grammatical mechanism 
involved. This mechanism  may be related to the fact that questions in 
themselves seem to be able to generate negative contexts. This has been 
observed earlier in the context of (some) so-called negative polarity items, 
which can also be licensed by questions. For instance: 
 
(10) a. George didn’t eat any breakfast today. 
b.  *George ate any breakfast today. 
c. Did George eat any breakfast today? 
 
Although questions are not overtly negative, Ladusaw (1980) already no- 
tices the availability of a biased negative answer (Giannakidou, 2002). 
Although  later accounts argue that the polarity item is in fact licensed 
by downward entailment or nonveridicality, and not by negation per se 
(Giannakidou, 2002; Zwarts, 1995), it seems from the observation in (9) 
that there is indeed some negation of a proposition involved in this case. 
I wonder if at this point Ad and I still disagree or not, but I do know 
that we’re both not crazy. And that is a positive opinion. 
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